DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND HEALTH

By V. MALIN

INTRODUCTION OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENT CASE STUDIES METHODOLOGY: SELECTION OF THE UNITS OF ANALYSIS DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE EU, US, BRAZIL, AND AUSTRALIA IN THE WTO ACTORS’ POSITIONS ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION SOURCES CHAPTERS’ OVERVIEW PART I SETTING THE STAGE 1 FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATIONS TWO-LEVEL GAMES LITERATURE AND TRADE POLICY: AN OVERVIEW INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS DOMESTIC-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS: SOCIETY- AND STATE-CENTRED APPROACHES EXECUTIVE–LEGISLATIVE RELATIONS NUMBER OF VETO PLAYERS LINK BETWEEN PARTIES AND INTEREST GROUPS DOMESTIC CONSTRAINTS AND INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INTEGRATIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE BARGAINING INTERNATIONAL LEVEL: THE TIME DIMENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS TIME DIMENSION AND CONCESSION RATES TIME PRESSURE: ELAPSED TIME AND CONCESSION RATES BEST ALTERNATIVE TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT REPETITIVE GAMES AND TOUGH BARGAINING STRATEGIES CONCLUSION 2 MULTILATERAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE REGIME CONTENTS EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE COOPERATION INCLUSION OF AGRICULTURE IN THE NEGOTIATING AGENDA AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE OF THE URUGUAY ROUND MARKET ACCESS EXPORT SUBSIDIES DOMESTIC SUPPORT AND THE SYSTEM OF BOXES IMPACT OF THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE ON DOMESTIC SUPPORT PART II DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 3 US TRADE POLITICS POWER DELEGATION IN US TRADE POLITICS RECIPROCAL TRADE AGREEMENTS ACT OF 1934 AND BEYOND FAILURE TO RATIFY THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE ORGANIZATION CHARTER TRADE EXPANSION ACT AND TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE OF ENACTMENT OF FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY IN STRENGTHENING CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IN THE 1980S CURRENT PROVISIONS OF FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY EX ANTE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES EX POST CONTROL MECHANISMS LINK BETWEEN PARTIES AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF INTEREST GROUPS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF FARM ORGANIZATIONS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS OF COMMODITY PRODUCER GROUPS US AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 4 EU TRADE POLITICS INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EU POLITICAL SYSTEM EVOLUTION OF EU TRADE POLITICS DELEGATION OF POWER AND CONTROL MECHANISMS EX ANTE CONTROL MECHANISMS: THE NEGOTIATING MANDATE CONTROL MECHANISMS AT LOCUM: THE 133 COMMITTEE EX POST CONTROL: VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY DEFECTION MEMBER STATES EUROPEAN COMMISSION FARMER AND BUSINESS GROUPS DOMESTIC-LEVEL INSTITUTIONS IN FRANCE STRUCTURE OF THE EXECUTIVE LINK BETWEEN PARTIES AND FARMER GROUPS THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 5 BRAZILIAN TRADE POLITICS BRAZILIAN TRADE POLITICS ADOPTION OF A MORE LIBERAL TRADE POLICY AFTER DECISION-MAKING PROCESS IN TRADE POLICY HIGH PARTY FRAGMENTATION THE BRAZILIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 6 AUSTRALIAN TRADE POLITICS AUSTRALIAN TRADE POLITICS AUSTRALIA’S TRADE DEPENDENCE ON GREAT BRITAIN UNTIL A ‘WESTMINSTER-INSPIRED’ DEMOCRACY THE AUSTRALIAN AGRICULTURAL SECTOR PART III NEGOTIATING TRADE LIBERALIZATION 7 SEATTLE MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE INTERNATIONAL-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS IDENTIFICATION OF ISSUES AND THE INITIAL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF THE ACTORS DEEP DIVISIONS AND NO TIME PRESSURE TO MAKE CONCESSIONS UNITED STATES FAILURE TO RENEW FAST TRACK NEGOTIATING AUTHORITY UNDER A DIVIDED GOVERNMENT POSITION OF INTEREST GROUPS EUROPEAN UNION 1999 CAP REFORM AND WTO NEGOTIATIONS EUROPEAN COMMISSION’S NEGOTIATING MANDATE COUNCIL–COMMISSION RELATIONSHIP BRAZIL INFORMAL CONSULTATIONS IN TRADE POLICY PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION ON THE BRAZILIAN NEGOTIATING POSITION AUSTRALIA ANTI-GLOBALIZATION CAMPAIGN OF THE ONE NATION PARTY 8 DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE A FIRST ASSESSMENT OF ACTORS’ NEGOTIATING POSITIONS DOHA MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 9–14 NOVEMBER DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ON AGRICULTURE TIME FRAMEWORK FOR THE DOHA ROUND CONGRESSIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ON NEW TRADE AND FARM BILLS MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE 2002 TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY BILL POSITIONS OF MAJOR INTEREST GROUPS ON THE NEW TRADE BILL PARLIAMENTARY DISCUSSION ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WTO ADVISORY GROUP 9 CANCUN MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE PRESENTATION OF DETAILED NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS THE HARBINSON TEXT: TRYING TO FIND A MIDDLE GROUND CANCUN MINISTERIAL MEETING 10–14 SEPTEMBER THE 2002 FARM BILL: INCREASING DOMESTIC SUPPORT IMPLICATIONS OF THE 2002 FARM BILL FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS CONGRESSIONAL REACTION TO THE G-20 COALITION POSITION OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL GROUPS WITH RESPECT TO THE G-20 DEMANDS MODIFICATION OF THE COMMISSION’S NEGOTIATING MANDATE THE 2003 CAP REFORM: DECOUPLING DIRECT PAYMENTS FROM PRODUCTION REACTION OF MAJOR AGRICULTURAL GROUPS TO THE CAP REFORM IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAP REFORM FOR WTO NEGOTIATIONS A NEW HETEROGENEOUS GOVERNING COALITION LULA DA SILVA’S TRADE POLICY WORKERS’ PARTY POSITION ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION SHIFT TOWARDS BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS FREE TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE US FARMERS’ ORGANIZATIONS POSITION ON THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 10 HONG KONG MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE US AND EU INITIATIVES TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD THE JULY 2004 FRAMEWORK FOR AGRICULTURE INFORMAL MEETINGS AND IMPASSE IN NEGOTIATIONS PRESENTATION OF NEW DETAILED NEGOTIATING PROPOSALS HONG KONG MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE 13–18 DECEMBER SETTLEMENT OF NEW DEADLINES SIGNATURE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION POSITIONS OF FARMER GROUPS ON THE US NEGOTIATING POSITION MEMBER STATES’ REACTION TO THE LAMY-FISCHLER INITIATIVE NOMINATION OF A NEW EUROPEAN COMMISSION CONFLICTUAL COUNCIL-COMMISSION RELATIONSHIP ENLARGEMENT OF THE GOVERNING COALITION ECONOMIC POLICY AND CORRUPTION SCANDALS REACTION OF FARMER GROUPS TO THE HONG KONG MEETING 11 GENEVA INFORMAL MEETING NEW DEADLINES AND THE SHADOW OF TRANSATLANTIC TRADE DISPUTES SIX WEEKS OF INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT ANY BREAKTHROUGH THE FALCONER DRAFT TEXT ON HUNDREDS OF OUTSTANDING ISSUES REJECTION OF THE ‘20-20-20’ FORMULA AND BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS REACTION OF MAJOR PLAYERS TO THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF NEGOTIATIONS MAJOR PLAYERS’ BEST ALTERNATIVES TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT CONGRESSIONAL AND FARM GROUPS’ OPPOSITION TO FURTHER CONCESSIONS DIVISIONS WITHIN THE COUNCIL ON FURTHER CONCESSIONS MOVING TOWARDS BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS PRESSURE FROM INTEREST GROUPS REACTION FROM INTEREST GROUPS AND THE LABOR PARTY ADDENDUM: ATTEMPTS TO REVIVE THE DOHA ROUND AFTER JULY WTO NEGOTIATIONS SO FAR SUMMARY OF RESULTS TIME PRESSURE AND BEST ALTERNATIVES TO A NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT EXECUTIVE–LEGISLATIVE RELATIONSHIP LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH