PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF GENETICS

By JOHN CLARK

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE INTEGRATED HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE INTEGRATED HPS IN PRACTICE: THE CASE OF THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS REFERENCES PART I HISTORY MENDEL’S PISUM REVISITED MENDEL’S CONCERN MENDEL AND GÄRTNER ON ENTWICKLUNG (DEVELOPMENT) MENDEL’S “ENTWICKLUNGSREIHE (DEVELOPMENTAL SERIES)” MENDEL’S NOVEL CONCEPTUALISATION: THE LAWS OF DEVELOPMENTAL SERIES MENDEL AND THE STUDY OF HEREDITY CONCLUSION DE VRIES’ MENDELISM REASSESSED THE REDISCOVERY STORY NO MENDEL, NO MENDELIANS! THE 3: 1 RATIO IN THE 1896 NOTES MENDEL AND THE LAW OF SEGREGATION DE VRIES’ INTRODUCTION OF SEGREGATION FROM MENDEL TO MENDELISM FROM ACTIVENESS TO DOMINANCE FROM CORRESPONDENCE TO SEGREGATION WELDON’S CHOICE RECONSIDERED THE MENDELIAN-BIOMETRICIAN CONTROVERSY WELDON AS A BIOMETRICIAN WELDON’S THEORY OF INHERITANCE THE OUTLINE THE METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY OF INHERITANCE THE AIM OF THEORY OF INHERITANCE THE THEORY SUMMARY AND REMARKS WELDON, NO BIOMETRICIAN? PEARSON VS WELDON RECONSIDERED BEYOND MENDELISM AND BIOMETRY PART II INTEGRATED HPS EXEMPLARISING THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS THE THEORY-BASED ACCOUNTS OF THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS THE KUHNIAN ACCOUNTS A NEW INTERPRETATION OF EXEMPLAR AND THE EXEMPLAR-BASED APPROACH AN EXEMPLAR-BASED ACCOUNT OF THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS A FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT OF THE PROGRESS IN EARLY GENETICS SCIENTI?C PROGRESS AND THE ORIGIN OF GENETICS A NEW FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO SCIENTI?C PROGRESS HOW EARLY GENETICS PROGRESSED THE PROBLEMS OF THE KUHN-LAUDAN FUNCTIONAL APPROACH REVISITED BEYOND KNOWLEDGE, TRUTH, AND INTERVENING THE PROBLEM OF THE LONG NEGLECT REVISITED: AN EXEMPLAR-BASED EXPLANATION TWO PROBLEMS OF THE LONG NEGLECT THE TRADITIONAL DIAGNOSES OF THE LONG NEGLECT EXPLANATION 1: MENDEL’S WORK WAS NOT ACCEPTED EXPLANATION 2: MENDEL’S WORK WAS UNKNOWN MENDEL’S CONTRIBUTION RECONSIDERED THE TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSES THE EXEMPLAR-BASED ANALYSIS WHY MENDEL’S CONTRIBUTION WAS NEGLECTED THE NATURE OF THE LONG NEGLECT THE EXEMPLAR-BASED EXPLANATION THE EXEMPLAR-BASED EXPLANATION AND OLD INTELLECTUAL EXPLANATIONS PART III PHILOSOPHY A NEW MODE OF CONCEPTUAL CONTINUITY CONCEPTUAL CHANGE: VARIANCE AND CONTINUITY WHAT IF EVERYTHING CHANGES? THE CASE OF THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO CONCEPTUAL CHANGE TWO MODES OF CONTINUITY AND CONCEPTUAL CONTINUITY THE CASE OF THE CONCEPT OF DOMINANCE REVISITED THE GAP PROBLEM IN HYPOTHETICO-DEDUCTIVISM MENDEL’S EVIDENCE AND THE GAP PROBLEM THE DIAGNOSIS OF THE GAP PROBLEM AND THE ACHINSTEINIAN SOLUTION A NEW SOLUTION: FROM EVIDENCE TO EVIDENTIAL PRACTICE THE GAP PROBLEM REVISITED THE DEFENCE OF DESCRIPTIVE ADEQUACY THE DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL ADEQUACY NORMATIVITY AND CONTEXTUALISM IN H-D EVIDENTIAL PRACTICE PROMISINGNESS IN THEORY CHOICE THEORY CHOICE IN SCIENCE THE CHOICES IN THE MENDELIAN-BIOMETRICIAN CONTROVERSY PROMISINGNESS AS POTENTIAL USEFULNESS PROMISINGNESS, POTENTIAL PROGRESSIVENESS, POTENTIAL FERTILITY, AND FRUITFULNESS ARGUMENT FROM NORMATIVITY