THE ROMANCE OF THE GAS INDUSTRY
CONTENTS THE SOVIET UNION’S RISE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POWER: A SHORT HISTORY THE BOLSHEVIKS’ ATTITUDE TOWARD OIL OIL IN WARTIME THE POLITICS OF OIL TRADE THE SOVIET “OIL OFFENSIVE” THE OIL SHOCK OF 1973/74 AND MOSCOW’S CHARM OFFENSIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOVIET “ENERGY CRISIS” FOR EASTERN EUROPE THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE BUILDING OF THE “WORLD’S BIGGEST PIPELINE” “SIBERIAN MIGHT” AND GAS FOR EUROPE STRUCTURE AND OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT VOLUME PART I FROM WORLD WAR TO COLD WAR: SOVIET OIL AND WESTERN REACTIONS FROM CRISIS TO PLENTY: THE SOVIET “OIL CAMPAIGN” UNDER STALIN OIL POLITICS AND “SECOND BAKU” IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD THE SOVIET OIL COMPLEX AND ITS EASTERN PARTS DURING WORLD WAR II THE POSTWAR YEARS CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION SHORT HISTORICAL OVERVIEW THE USSR’S GROWING INTEREST IN IRANIAN OIL THE USSR ENTERS THE COMPETITION FOR OIL RESOURCES KAVTARADZE’S OIL MISSION IN IRAN CONTINUING SOVIET STRUGGLES THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS AND THE OIL QUESTION CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRANIAN CRISIS “RED OIL” AND WESTERN REACTIONS: THE CASE OF BRITAIN SOVIET OIL EXPORTS “PATRONS OF THE UK OIL COMPANIES” THE FIRST ROUND THE SOVIETS AND THE BOARD OF TRADE ATTACK DREAMS OF AN OIL CARTEL OIL FOR SHIPS DEBATES AT NATO AND THE EEC IN RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET “OIL OFFENSIVE” IN THE EARLY 1960S THE SOVIET “OIL OFFENSIVE” AND WESTERN REACTIONS THE SOVIET OIL THREAT AT THE EEC A DANGEROUS FRIENDSHIP TROUBLES OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP PART II FROM COLD WAR TO DÉTENTE: SOVIET ENERGY AND THE EXPANSION OF EAST–WEST TRADE DECISION-MAKING IN THE SOVIET ENERGY SECTOR IN POST-STALINIST TIMES: THE FAILURE OF KHRUSHCHEV’S ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION STRATEGY GENESIS OF AND RATIONALE BEHIND KHRUSHCHEV’S “PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT” THE “PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT:” HIGH AMBITIONS AND INITIAL SUCCESS GOSPLAN, INTEREST GROUPS, AND THE CRISIS OF THE “PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT” THE “GAS PAUSE” IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY (1963–1964) KHRUSHCHEV’S ATTEMPT AT RECONSTRUCTING HIS “PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT” (1962–1964) THE EXPORT OF OIL AND GAS: POTENTIALS AND PROBLEMS KHRUSHCHEV’S OPPOSITION TO AN ACCELERATED CONSTRUCTION OF OIL AND GAS PIPELINES (1963–1964) ITALY’S CHALLENGE TO THE “SEVEN SISTERS” ENI’S CONTRACTS WITH THE SOVIET UNION US REACTIONS TO ENI’S AGREEMENTS BETWEEN BIPOLARISM AND DE´TENTE GAZ DE FRANCE AND SOVIET NATURAL GAS: BALANCING TECHNOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS WITH POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS, 1950S TO 1980S FROM TECHNICAL PARTNERSHIP TO THE EMERGENCE OF REAL INTEREST IN SOVIET GAS (1956–1969) THE FRENCH GAS SECTOR CONSIDERS SOVIET CONTRACTS AS A SOURCE OF SUPPLY (1969–1979) TOWARD A NEW GAS CONTRACT BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE USSR RISE OF WESTERN SIBERIA AND THE SOVIET–WEST GERMAN ENERGY RELATIONSHIP DURING THE 1970S AN “EARLY” SIBERIAN STRATEGY A SOVIET–GERMAN PARTNERSHIP EMERGES THE USSR REACHES OUT EF?CIENCY PROBLEMS AND THE SOVIET INTERNATIONAL ROLLBACK THE “SIBERIAN CAMPAIGN” STARTS THE “DEAL OF THE CENTURY” FROM LINKAGE TO ECONOMIC WARFARE: ENERGY, SOVIET–AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR OIL AND SOVIET POWER SOVIET OIL AND US POLICY THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE SIBERIAN NATURAL GAS PIPELINE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE WORLD OIL MARKET THE THIRD OIL SHOCK AND THE SOVIET UNION US ENERGY POLICY AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR PART III FROM CRISIS TO COLLAPSE: SOVIET ENERGY AND THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE CREATING A COMMON ENERGY SPACE: THE BUILDING OF THE DRUZHBA OIL PIPELINE THE SOVIET ECONOMY AFTER STALIN’S DEATH PLANNING THE PIPELINE: THE CMEA AS A COMMUNICATION PLATFORM CONSTRUCTING THE “OIL ARTERY” WESTERN OBSTRUCTION EXTENDING THE PIPELINE CALCULATING THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE: SOVIET OIL, EAST–WEST TRADE, AND THE END OF THE SOCIALIST BLOC CMEA PRICING AND SOVIET DISCONTENT EC PROTECTIONISM CREATES PRESSURES CMEA INTEGRATION: A THREAT AND A POSSIBILITY THE SOVIETS PUSH FOR A CHANGE IN CMEA PRICING THE DEBT PROBLEM, PERESTROIKA AND THE COLLAPSE OF CMEA TRADE DRIFTING APART: SOVIET ENERGY AND THE COHESION OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC IN THE 1970S AND 1980S THE ENERGY INDUSTRY IN THE CMEA GAS AS A SOLUTION TO THE ENERGY CRISIS NUCLEAR ENERGY AND THE INTEGRATION OF THE ELECTRICITY GRID AS A SOLUTION TO THE ENERGY CRISIS THE ENERGY CRISIS AND THE POLISH CRISIS OF THE POLISH CRISIS, ENERGY SHORTAGES, AND THE DEBT QUESTION THE DISINTEGRATION OF CMEA IN THE 1980S THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEGACIES OF ENERGY DEPENDENCIES IN EASTERN EUROPE THE SOVIET–CMEA ENERGY RELATIONSHIP: ESSENTIAL FEATURES AND PATTERNS LEGACIES FOR RUSSIA LEGACIES FOR THE FORMER CMEA STATES LEGACIES FOR THE ENERGY-DEPENDENT POST-SOVIET STATES THE SOVIET UNION’S RISE AS AN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY POWER: A SHORT HISTORY IN NO OTHER DOMAIN ARE RUSSIA AND EUROPE LINKED TOGETHER AS CLOSELY AS IN THE AREA OF ENERGY OVER THE COURSE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, ENERGY ?OWS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST HAVE OVERCOME IDEOLOGICAL BARRIERS, WARS, AND SANCTIONS SOON AFTER THE BOLSHEVIKS SEIZED POWER IN 1917, THEY EMULATED THE APPROACH OF THEIR TSARIST PREDECESSORS BY EXPORTING OIL PRODUCED IN THE CAUCASUS TO THE CAPITALIST WEST IN ORDER TO BUY WESTERN TECHNOLOGY NECESSARY FOR SOVIET INDUSTRIALIZATION IN THE 1930S, A FAILED ENERGY POLICY MARKEDLY DECREASED THE SOVIET UNION’S IMPORTANCE AS AN OIL SUPPLIER TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS DURING WORLD WAR II, THE SOVIET UNION EVEN HAD TO IMPORT FUEL, PARTICULARLY FOR AVIATION, FROM THE UNITED STATES (US) INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO DEVELOP NEW OIL ?ELDS IN THE VOLGA- URAL REGION RE-ESTABLISHED THE SOVIET UNION’S SIGNI?CANCE ON THE EUROPEAN OIL MARKET FROM THE LATE 1950S ONWARD IN THE FROSTY ATMOSPHERE OF THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD, THE SOVIET “OIL OFFENSIVE,” AS IT WAS SOMETIMES CALLED IN THE WEST, STIRRED FEARS OF MOSCOW’S GROWING IN?UENCE OVER EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, PROMPTING THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) TO ADVISE ITS MEMBERS TO SHOW RESTRAINT IN PURCHASING SOVIET OIL IN 1962, THE WESTERN ALLIANCE EVEN IMPOSED AN EMBARGO ON THE SALE OF STEEL PIPES AND PIPELINE TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION DESPITE THESE MEASURES, WESTERN EUROPE’S IMPORTS OF SOVIET OIL INCREASED STEADILY, AND THE EMBARGO WAS LIFTED IN 1966 ESPECIALLY THE GLOBAL